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Article 12

RECENT CASE NOTES
the maker thereof. It was held that the holder of said note was entitled
to prove its claim against the indorser's estate for the full amount, and
to receive dividends until the forty percent balance was paid.6
A similar case exists where a creditor holds as security the promise
of third parties to pay the debt of a corporation in case said corporation
does not pay it. In such situation it has been contended that the creditor
must first exhaust his securities and deduct the proceeds thereof, and
then file a claim against the insolvent corporation for the balance, but
it was held that the creditor could prove his full claim.7 The court therein
expressed the vital point which distinguishes between secured and unsecured
creditors as follows, "In no sense is the promise property of the insolvent
corporation which can inure to the benefit of its general creditors."
The case of McGrat. v. Carnegie Tusnt Co. et al.,8 which the Indiana
Supreme Court aptly cited to support its decision herein, is directly in
point. Therein a bank made a loan of $140,000.00 and took promissory
notes therefor. The loan was made on condition that the proceeds be
paid to a trustee and invested in stock, said stock then to be held as
security by the bank making the loan. In fulfillment of that condition,
the $140,000.00 was paid to a trust company which became insolvent after
having failed to purchase the stock according to its agreement. The
makers of the notes having paid the bank $16,000, it was contended that
the bank would have to make a deduction from its claim of said amount.
The highest court of New York9 held, however, that the bank's share
in the assets of the trust company should be computed on $140,000.00,
the full amount of the trust deposit. It was declared that the contractural
relationship between the bank and the trust company "had no concern
with payments made by strangers."
Applying these rules to the instant case, it is obvious that the proceeds
of insurance on the life of S would in no way increase the assets of the
insolvent corporation or inure to the benefit of its general creditors. The
trust fund created by S in favor of the appellant was in no way a security
furnished by the insolvent. The appellant was not a "secured creditor".
Since the corporation was insolvent, appellant's claim would necessarily
yield a dividend of something less than the amount of the debt. If the
amount paid by a "stranger" is deducted from appellant's claim, the appellant would thereby obviously have its rights diminished as against the
true debtor. Granting, of course, that the appellant can in no event
be permitted to recover more than the actual value of its claim, the
result of the decision seems both logically and practically sound.
P. J. D.
EVEDENCE-INFERENCE UPON INFERENCe-Plaintiff charged defendant
with negligence whereby decedent received a fatal shock of electricity.
Instruction No. 5 was as follows: "hence under the law of this state
an inference cannot be raised from or based upon an inference. You
$Commercial & Savings Bank v. Jenks Lumber Co. (1911), 194 Fed. 739.
1
Adams v. Vancouver Nat. Bank, et al. (Wash. 1931), 2 Pac. (2d) 684.
6 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787 (1917).
9 Cardozo, T., in McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co. (1917), 221 N. Y. 92, 116
N. E. 787.
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* * * cannot under the law infer that decedent was at the time of
his death in such a position as to make or form a grounded circuit thru
his body in the event his hand should come in contact with an electrical
current, and upon or from that inference infer that deceased at such time
came in contact with an electrical current which passed thru his body and
resulted in his death." Held, this instruction was not erroneous.1
The principal case lays down the rule that an inference cannot be
based on an inference. Wigmore 2 strongly attacks such a rule. An
inference is a matter of logic; it is an act of reasoning; a fact is inferred
from the existence of other facts that are known; much of human knowledge on all subjects is derived from this source. 3 Wigmore says there
is no such rule prohibiting the basing of inference on inference, nor can
there be any such rule. "For example," he says, "on a charge of murder,
defendant's gun is found discharged; from this we infer that he discharged
it, and from this we infer that it was his bullet which struck and killed
decedent. Or, defendant is shown to have been sharpening a knife; from
this we argue that he had a design to use it on deceased, and from this
we argue that the fatal stab was the result of this design. From these
and innumerable daily instances we build up inference on inference, and
yet no court ever thought of forbidding it. All departments of reasoning,
all scientific work, every day life and every days trials, proceed upon such
data."
In Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board,4 the court
points out that "certain well recognized authorities insist that the rule
that a presumption can never be based on a presumption or an inference
on an inference is never strictly followed." It has been stated that the
rule that an inference can never be based on an inference, if strictly
enforced, would never permit a criminal case to be adequately prosecuted.5
Wills on Circumstantial Evidence,6 suggests a solution of the problem.
Stated briefly, Wills suggests this rule: an inference in the chain of
inferences is based on a fact proved by direct evidence. While this rule
is acceptable, it is stretching the meaning of words to say that Wills'
suggestion is the meaning of the rule that an inference cannot be based
on an inference. Several cases have adopted the rule suggested by Wills.
Before going into Indiana cases on the question, the very recent case
of Gears V. State7 should be noted. The Supreme Court in an opinion
by Treanor, J. gives an excellent discussion of circumstantial evidence
and the working of the mind. It may be argued that this case lends
support to the view that there is no rule against basing inference on
inference. In this case it was contended by defendant that to reach a
certain conclusion it would be necessary to base an inference on an infer'Altnan v. Indianapolis Union By. Co, Appellate Court of Indiana, December 11, 1931, 178 N. E. 691.
2Wigmore, Evidence (2nd), Vol. 1, Ch. 4, See. 41, p. 258 (1923).
sMcCarty v. State (1904), 162 Ind. 218; Rex v. Burdette (1820). 4 Barn. &
Ald. 95, 161, 106 Engl. Repr. 873.
277 Ill. 96, 111, 115 N. E. 149 (1917).
Rex v. Burdette (1820), 4 Barn. & Aid. 95, 161, 106 Engl. Repr. 873; Wigmore, Evidence (2nd), Vol. 1, Ch. 4, Sec. 41, p. 258 (1923).
6
Am. Ed. 189 (1905).
7180 N. E. 585 (1932).
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ence, which could not be done. In discussing this the court said that the
particular conclusion could not be reached for the reason that it would
be an unreasonable inference. The court said, "It is necessary that we
leave to the sound judgment of the jury, some margin for logical grouping
of facts for the purpose of drawing inferences of fact, and for the utilizations of these inferences of fact with other facts as the basis of further
inference of fact. After all the 'logic' or 'reason' which we should expect
of the jury is largely a common sense evaluation of the probative force
of all the evidence in the light of everyday experience and observation."
Here, it seems, is a statement that inferences may be used in raising
inferences.
As stated previously, however, there is no lack of authority to support
the rule under discussion.8
Some other Indiana cases may be considered as of questionable authority.
U. S. Cement Co. v. Whitted9 and Warner v. MarshalllO may be harmonized
with the view that all reasonable inferences may be drawn, because an
analysis of these cases reveals that the inferences sought to be raised were
unreasonable. Warner v. Marshall also made a doubtful application of
the rule against inference on inference. It applied this rule in order to
keep from basing an inference on an inference which a witness had drawn.
It may be contended that this is an improper application. The inference
drawn by a witness from certain facts is not the inference of the court
or jury. So long as the inference remains that of the witness, there is
no inference of fact in the case for the simple reason that the witness
is not the tribunal which finds facts and draws inferences. When the
proper tribunal draws an inference, then there is an inference which may
be subjected to the limitation of being incapable of supporting another
inference. But until then, there is no inference in the factual set-up;
such as the finding of fact by a witness is not a fact in the case for
the simple reason that the court or jury finds the facts.
Though Indiana does not lack authority in support, there is some
authority which would seem to repudiate the rule. These cases hold
in more or less definite language that an inference may be based on an
8Indiana cases which have stated that an inference cannot be based on a.1
inference are: Morgan Construction Co. v. Dulin (1916), 184 Ind. 652, 109 N. B.
960; Alexander v,. Capitol Lumber Co. (1914), 181 Ind. 527, 105 N. E. 45; Dowell
v. State (1914), 181 Ind. 68, 101 N. E. 815 (the only real doubt here was whether
the witness told the truth) ; Warner v'. Marshall (1900), 166 Ind. 88, 117-18, 75
N. E. 582; Young 'v.
Montgomery (1903), 161 Ind. 68, 67 N. E. 684; Binn v. State
(1879), 66 Ind. 428; U. S. Cement Co. -. Whitted (1900), 46 Ind. App. 105, 90
N. E. 481; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vance (1915), 58 Ind. App. 1, 108
N. E. 158. Some other cases which have stated the same rule are: U. S. v. Ross
(1875). 92 U. S. 281; Manning v. Ins. Co. (1879), 100 U. S. 693; State v. Kelly
(1904), 77 Conn. 266, 58 Atl. 705; Kevern v. People (1906), 224 Ill. 170, 79 N. E.
574; Philip v. Travelers ins. Co. (1921), 288 Mo. 175, 231 S. W. 947; People v.
Razezicz (1912), 206 N. Y. 249, 99 N. E. 557; Fadden v.McKinney (1914), 87
Vt. 316, 89 Atl. 351. See also Jones, Evidence In Civil Cases (3rd), See. 104, p.
135 (1924); Chamberlain, Modern Law of Evidence, Vol 2, Sec. 1029, p. 1228
(1911) ; 10 R. C. L. 870, See. 13; 10 Ann. Cas. 1094.
'46 Ind. App. 105, 90 N. E. 481 (1910).
10166 Ind. 88, 117-18, 76 N. E. 582 (1906).
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inference. While Hinshaw v. Statell states as a general rule that an inference cannot be based on an inference, it states as an exception to the general
rule that an inference may be the basis of another inference provided
the first inference has the basis of a proved fact. With such an exception,
little, if anything, is left of the rule; this is Wigmore's view, also. He
states that this case has repudiated the rule. An analysis of the exception
would seem to bear this out. According to the exception whenever direct
evidence of some fact is brought into the case the inferences therefrom
may become the basis of other inferences. In the absence of any facts
there is no source from which to infer. In requiring the existence of a
proved fact before inferences may be built on inferences the exception
follows logically. The first fact will always have to be proved by direct
evidence, because, until then, there is nothing from which inferences may
be drawn.
The recent Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. SantoS1 2 is a case
deserving of attention. This was a homicide case. Defendant contended
that deceased committed suicide, and offered evidence that shortly before
the day of her death deceased declared her intention of shooting accused
and then herself. The higher court held this evidence admissible, saying
"* * * the evidence in question is admissible because suicidal intent,
like any other purpose, is a mental condition, which can manifest itself,
primarily, only thru some act or word of the person in question; hence
relevant acts or words may be proved as the basis of an inference that
the, state of mind, or intention, in question did in fact exist, from which
fact, and others in the case, 13 the conclusion may be drawn that the design
contended for had been carried into execution." Briefly, the court holds
mental state might be inferred, and that another fact might be inferred
therefrom.
The rule deducible from the latter group of Indiana cases discussed,14
is that an inference properly drawn may become the basis of other inferences. Stated thus, it would seem that this rule should be embraced within
the rule that all reasonable inferences from the evidence may be drawn.
Therefore, no special rule on the basing of an inference on an inference
is needed. The broader rule of "all reasonable inferences" should include
the basing of inference on inference when reasonable.
A proper interpretation to be put on the cases which have stated as
law that an inference cannot be raised from an inference would seem to
be that suggested by Wigmore: "the judicial utterances that sanction the
fallacious and impractical limitation, ordinarily put forward without authority, must be taken as valid only for the particular evidentiary facts therein
relied upon."
S. K.
U147

Inl. 334, 363, 47 N.

. 157 (1896).

Cleveland, C., C & St. L. R. Co. v. Stark

See also to the same effect

(1915), 68 Ind. App. 341, 361, 106 N. E.

646; Indiana Creek.Coal Co. v. Calvert (1918), 68 Ind. App. 474, 120 N. E. 709;
Public Savings Ins. Co. v. Greenwalc (1918),

68 Ind. App. 609, 624, 121 N. E. 47;

Scottish Inmsurance Co. v. Linkenhelt (1919), 70 Ind. App. 324, 121 N. . 373.
-275

Pa. 515, 119 A.

596 (1923).

Evidence, (2nd) Vol. 3, Ch. 56, Sec. 1726, p. 700 (1923).
Supra, note 11.

1"Wigmore,
4

